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COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF BULLET
LEAD AS FORENSIC EVIDENCE*
Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Ph.D.**

INTRODUCTION
In crimes involving shootings, bullets may be recovered from
the crime scene and unexpended cartridges found in the possession
of a suspect. Did they come from the same source? The method of
choice for making this determination is a compositional analysis of
trace elements in the bullet lead. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI or Bureau) laboratory in Quantico, Virginia,
performs such analyses in federal crimes and, at the request of state
law enforcement, in state crimes. It appears to be the only
laboratory in the United States to do so on a regular basis.1
Standard FBI procedure measures the concentrations of antimony,
arsenic, bismuth, cadmium, copper, silver, and tin through an
analytic method called inductively coupled plasma-optical
* Originally published in a somewhat different form in Chance. Copyright
2004 by the American Statistical Association. All rights reserved.
** Michael O. Finkelstein is a member of the New York Bar, and the
adjunct faculty of Columbia Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Mr. Finkelstein was a member of the National Research Council
Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Comparison,
which published a report discussed in this article. A portion of this paper was
delivered by Mr. Finkelstein at the Science for Judges program held at Brooklyn
Law School on March 27, 2004. Bruce Levin is a Professor of Biostatistics and
Chair of the Department of Biostatistics at the Mailman School of Public Health,
Columbia University.
1
The technique has been used by crime laboratories in other countries,
among them, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, and South
Africa.
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emission spectroscopy. If the concentrations of all seven elements
are close enough to be within measurement error, the FBI expert
reports that the bullets are “analytically indistinguishable,” for
which we will use the shorthand term “match.” The expert
concludes from this that the bullets came from the same melt of
lead, which is evidence that they were made at the same time by
the same manufacturer, and some circumstantial evidence that they
were bought at the same time by the suspect. Bullet lead evidence
can thus act as a link tying a suspect to a crime.
The method for measuring these element concentrations is not
in serious dispute; however, arguments frequently arise regarding
the probative value of a match. Beginning in 2000, two
metallurgists, one of whom had worked at the FBI, began attacking
the FBI’s bullet-lead matching testimony in court appearances. The
Bureau responded by conducting and publishing studies on bulletlead matching and, in 2003, retained the National Research
Council (NRC) to study the matter. The NRC appointed a
Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental
Comparison (Committee) to study the technique and its
presentation in court. The Committee met four times between
February and May of 2003, heard presentations from the FBI,
bullet manufacturers, and others, made analyses of FBI data, and
researched cases in which FBI experts had testified. The
Committee also invited critics of the FBI to appear; one lawyer
accepted the invitation, made a written submission, and addressed
the committee. The principal critics, however, declined to appear
or make submissions. The Committee issued its report, entitled
Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence, in February
2004.2
In discussing the Committee’s findings, we will focus on two
aspects of this forensic technique: (1) testimony of the FBI’s expert
witnesses and (2) scientific support for the reliability of the test.
We begin by describing briefly the bullet manufacturing process
and the FBI’s procedures for analyzing the composition of bullet
2

COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL
COMPOSITION COMPARISON, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004) [hereinafter Report].
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lead.
I. THE BULLET–LEAD MANUFACTURING PROCESS
Recycled car batteries are the principal source of the lead used
in most bullets made in the United States. Secondary smelters
refine the lead by melting it in kettle-type furnaces to remove or
reduce the amounts of certain trace elements. Manufacturers
specify antimony within a range and other trace elements merely as
maximum amounts. For example, one manufacturer specified a
range of 0.85% ± 0.15% antimony for lead used for .22 long rifle
bullets; maximal impurities for the other elements ranged from
0.2% for tin to 0.01% for silver.3
The kettles have a capacity of 25 to 150 tons a day. Molten
lead is poured from the kettle to cast sows, billets, pigs or ingots. A
sow will weigh 2,000 lbs; a billet, 70 to 350 lbs; and a pig or ingot,
60 to 125 lbs. Castings by secondary smelters are sold to bullet
manufacturers, who sometimes remelt and recast the lead. The cast
lead is made into a wire by squeezing it through a narrow opening,
like toothpaste from a tube, in a machine called an extruder. The
wire is then cut into slugs, from which the bullets are shaped. The
bullets are stored in a bin until they are assembled into cartridges.
Slugs from several melts may be placed in the same bin. The
number of bullets that are made from a melt or pour will vary
widely. For example, a melt pot of 200,000 lbs will yield
35,000,000 .22-caliber bullets, while a pig or ingot will yield
10,000 to 20,000 bullets.4 The yield for larger caliber bullets will
be smaller. When cartridges are packed into boxes (which typically
hold fifty bullets each) there is routinely more than one melt
represented in a box. Bullets from a single melt may be represented
in thousands of boxes.
II. THE FBI’S ANALYTIC METHOD AND MATCHING CRITERIA
In making its analysis, the Bureau takes three fragments from
3
4

Id. at 78, Table 4.4.
Id. at 74, Table 4.3.
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each bullet, measures the seven elements for each fragment, and
then takes the average of the replicate measurements for each
element.5 It also estimates the standard deviation of its
measurements from the variation in measurements of the three
fragments. The concentrations in each fragment depend on the
element involved. For example, in one sample they ranged from
1.13% by weight for antimony to 0.0046% for silver.6 The
standard deviation of the measurement ranged between 0.06
percentage points for antimony to 0.0001 percentage points for
silver.7
The FBI currently uses one of two criteria to determine
whether two bullets match. In the first method, the Bureau
calculates a confidence interval of two standard deviations on
either side of the average measurement for each element.8 If the
confidence intervals for the crime scene bullets and the suspect’s
bullets overlap to any extent for all seven elements, the bullets are
declared to match. Because the standard deviations for the
measurements of two bullets tend to be the same for the same
element, differences of up to four standard deviations between
measurements effectively are allowed for a match.
This is not the standard way to define a match window in
statistical science but rather an approximation of it. The usual
criterion would define a window by the standard error of the
difference between the two measurements, which is the square root
of the sum of the variances for the two average measurements. If
5

The Bureau in fact makes three measurements for each fragment and
takes the average as the measurement for that fragment. Since the committee
treated that average as a single measurement for each fragment, we shall do so
here. Id. at 29 n.5.
6
Robert D. Koons & Diana M. Grant, Compositional Variation in Bullet
Lead Manufacture, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. No. 5 1, 3 Table 8 (2002). This sample
may understate the full range of variation; most bullets in the 1,837 sample
contain one or more elements at concentrations more like 0.0002% at the low
end. See discussion infra note 42.
7
Antimony is present in larger quantities because it is added to the lead to
increase hardness; except for maximal limitations, the others are uncontrolled
trace elemental impurities.
8
When we refer to standard deviation, we mean the standard deviation of
the three measurements, not the standard error of the mean measurement.
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the usual 5% test of statistical significance is applied as the
criterion for the test as a whole, it must be adjusted for multiple
comparisons when dealing with each element. In the commonly
used Bonferroni method of adjustment, because there are seven
chances to reject the null hypothesis (one for each element), the
level of significance required to reject the null hypothesis for each
element would be 0.05/7 = 0.00714.9 Applying a standard
statistical test, this probability is reached at 5.07 standard errors.10
Assuming that the standard deviation of measurement (denoted by
σ) is the same for both bullets, the bullets would be declared to
match if the difference between them is no more than 5.07 x
(2/3)½σ = 4.14σ.11 On this assumption, the FBI’s 4σ match window
is even slightly narrower than statistical convention would dictate.
The size of the match window is important because the wider the
window, the greater the number of declared matches and, with that,
a greater risk that bullets will be declared matches even though
they come from different melts.
This does not mean that the Bureau’s two-standard-deviation
rule is beyond criticism. From the criminal justice point of view,
what matters most is that the test has sufficient statistical power.
That is, if bullets come from different melts, the test with high
probability will reject the null hypothesis that they are from the
same melt. The practice of estimating standard deviations from
only three observations significantly increases the size of the
required match window, thus reducing the power of the test. It is
for this reason that the Committee recommended that standard

9

With this adjustment, the level of significance for the overall test would
be no greater than 5%. For a discussion of Bonferroni and other methods of
adjustment, see MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR
LAWYERS 211 (2d ed. 2001).
10
The test is a t-test with four degrees of freedom. For a discussion of the ttest, see id. at 222.
11
If the variance of a single measurement is σ2, then the variance of the
average of the three measurements is σ2/3; the variance of the difference
between the two average measurements (assuming σ2 is the same for both
bullets) is σ2/3 + σ2/3, with standard error equal to [σ2/3 + σ2/3]1/2. A 95% twosided confidence interval, making the Bonferroni adjustment for the seven
comparisons, is equal to 5.07 standard errors, or 5.07 x (2/3)½σ = 4.14σ.
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deviations be estimated from historical data.12 If this were done,
the number of standard errors required for the difference between
the two measurements would be reduced to about 2.2σ, or almost
half of the 4σ window.13 This would significantly increase the
power of the test.
In the second method, the FBI declares a match when the
ranges of the two average measurements for an element overlap,
that is, the largest of the three measurements for one bullet is
greater than the smallest measurement for the other bullet. The
range window is generally narrower than the two-standarddeviation window and would tend to generate fewer false positives.
Range overlap methods are appealing for statistical reasons
because they are non-parametric and, therefore, universally valid
for any distribution of elemental compositions. They are also
appealing for the practical reason that they are easier to explain to
a jury.
III. THE FBI’S TESTIMONY
Connecting a bullet from a crime scene to a particular suspect
involves two steps. First, the FBI must perform a bullet lead
analysis to determine whether the bullets found at the crime scene
came from the same melt as the bullets found in the possession of
the suspect. Second, an inference must then be made that the
matching bullets came from the defendant. Problems arise
regarding both of these steps.

12

Report, supra note 2, at 69. The committee’s recommendation assumes
that good estimates of the standard errors can be made from the historical data;
there are difficulties in this assumption and the idea has not been tested.
13
Using a relatively large amount of historical data to estimate standard
errors would justify using the normal distribution, which for the Bonferroniadjusted significance probability of 0.00714 is 2.69 standard errors. 2.69 x
(2/3)½ σ = 2.2σ. Power would be further increased if methods other than
Bonferroni were used to adjust for multiple comparisons. One such alternative is
the Hochberg method. See Yosef Hochberg, A Sharper Bonferroni Procedure
for Multiple Tests of Significance, 75 BIOMETRIKA 800 (1988); FINKELSTEIN &
LEVIN, supra note 9.
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A. Bullet Analysis
In some cases, FBI witnesses have testified in a way that was
considered unobjectionable by the Committee; for example,
witnesses have testified that bullets were analytically
indistinguishable,14 or that the bullets could have come from the
same melt or source lead.15 In a number of cases, however, the
Committee found that FBI testimony had gone considerably
beyond what the science would justify. FBI witnesses have
testified without qualification that matching bullets came from the
same melt or source of lead, or were manufactured by the same
company at the same time. Witnesses also have testified and
prosecutors have argued, with various qualifications (or none), that
bullets came from the same box of cartridges.
For example, in United States v. Davis, the expert testified
unequivocally that the “bullets must have been manufactured at the
same Remington factory, must have come from the same batch of
lead, must have been packaged on or about the same day, and
could have come from the same box.”16 In State v. Washington, the
FBI expert testified that the elemental profile of bullets in a melt
was “unique.”17
Further, in State v. Noel, the prosecution in summation referred
to snowflakes and fingerprints to describe the uniqueness of melts
of lead, and argued that the FBI witness’ testimony was reliable
scientific evidence not only that the bullets “came from the same
source of lead at the manufacturer,” but also that they were “sold

14

See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001) (quoting a witness as testifying that “[t]he lead material in one bullet and
one projectile was analytically indistinguishable, as was the lead in one bullet
and the other two projectiles”).
15
See, e.g., State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Or. 1974) (stating
that that the “analyses showed that the bullet could have come from the same
batch of metal as the group of bullets which was taken from defendant’s home
but not from the same batch as any of the other groups”).
16
103 F.3d 660, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1996).
17
Trial Transcript of Testimony of Charles Peters at 9, 21-22, State v.
Washington, No. 96-GS-40-10316 (S.C. Ct. 1998).
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in the same box.”18 The New Jersey intermediate appellate court
reversed the conviction, holding that “the clear import of the
fingerprint and snowflake comparison was to suggest to the jury a
scientific certainty in the inference that defendant had possessed
both bullets and to suggest to the jury a conclusiveness of that
inference that clearly was not warranted.”19 On further appeal,
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court conceded that the
prosecutor’s argument may have been “excessive,” but held that it
might pass as “fair comment” and reinstated the conviction.20
More acceptably, witnesses have testified that the laboratory
finding that bullets matched was “consistent with their having
come from the same box of ammunition,”21 or was evidence that
they “could have come from the same box or another box
manufactured on the same day.”22 Although literally true, these
formulations invite the jury to overestimate the evidence.
Nevertheless, they have been upheld on appeal.23
The Committee disapproved of such testimony and argument.
The obvious point is that witnesses who testify without
qualification and prosecutors who argue in this manner do not
admit that melts are not unique in elemental composition and that
tests have measurement error. Thus, the fact that bullets match is
only a probability statement that they came from the same melt.
The Committee also disapproved of testimony suggesting that
matching bullets came from the same box because of the large
number of boxes that are filled, wholly or partly, with bullets from
18

723 A.2d 602, 608 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999).
State v. Noel, 697 A.2d 157, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev’d,
723 A.2d 602 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999).
20
Noel, 723 A.2d at 607.
21
State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982) (“Further, neutron
activation analysis revealed that the bullets taken from Morgan and Stone and
the ammunition found with the defendant were of the same chemical
composition, consistent with their having come from the same box of
ammunition.”).
22
State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994).
23
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that “[t]he expert testimony demonstrated a high probability that the
bullets spent at the first robbery and the last robbery originated from the same
box of cartridges”).
19
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a single melt. But the Committee’s objections also went deeper
than this: they included the case in which a witness testifies that
matching bullets probably came from the same melt. To
understand the Committee’s objection to such testimony, one has
to consider the probative force of the matching evidence in more
detail.
The probative force of finding that two bullets match can be
expressed by the odds that they came from the same melt, given
that they match. These odds are usually called posterior odds
because they are posterior to, or conditioned upon, the matching
evidence. By Bayes’s theorem of elementary probability, these
odds are equal to the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood ratio.
The equation can be written as follows:

Posterior odds = Prior odds × Likelihood ratio
The terms of the equation can be defined as:
P[ same melt | match]
P[ same melt ]
P[match | same melt ]
=
×
.
P[different melts | match] P[different melts] P[match | different melts]

In this equation, P[ same melt | match] is read as the conditional
probability that two bullets would have come from the same melt,
given that they match, with analogous interpretations for the other
conditional probability terms.
Unlike the other terms in the equation, the prior odds are not
based on conditional probabilities, but rather are the odds that one
would give that the bullets came from the same melt before they
are tested for match status. Prior odds must be based on the other
evidence in the case that connects the suspect to the crime.
Typically, there is no objective way of estimating prior odds; this
must be done subjectively, based on the odds that the factfinder
would give in betting on the proposition, in this case, that the
bullets came from the same melt (which the factfinder might
explicitly or implicitly infer from other evidence of the suspect’s
guilt). Expert witnesses have no particular expertise beyond that of
the lay factfinders to estimate prior odds and, consequently, have
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no basis for using their estimates of prior odds to testify as experts
to posterior odds based on the matching test.
The second part of the equation, the likelihood ratio, is a
measure of the strength of the matching evidence. In theory, this
can be determined on an objective basis and is an appropriate
subject of expertise. In this context, the likelihood ratio for the
matching evidence is equal to the probability of observing a match,
given that the bullets came from the same melt, divided by the
probability of observing such a match if the bullets came from
different melts. The larger the likelihood ratio, the stronger the
evidence.
Consider first the numerator of the likelihood ratio. If melts of
lead were perfectly homogeneous in elemental composition, the
probability of observing a match if two bullets came from the same
melt would be one, so the numerator of the likelihood ratio would
be one.24 Allowing 5% for measurement error, for example, the
numerator would be 0.95.
The denominator of the likelihood ratio is the probability of
declaring a match when two bullets come from different melts.
This type of error is known as a false positive. Assume that the rate
of false positives is 1/1000. In that case, the denominator of the
likelihood ratio would be 1/1000, and the likelihood ratio,
assuming the numerator to be 0.95, would be 0.95/(1/1000) = 950.
On these assumptions, matching is strong evidence that the bullets
come from the same melt.
If the assumed value for the likelihood ratio is fully supported
(an important subject that we will address), what can the expert say
in such a case? She cannot testify to the odds or probabilities that
the bullets came from the same melt because those odds depend on
the prior odds and, as noted, she has no more expertise in
appraising those odds than the lay factfinders. Moreover, the
expert’s prior odds may not be the same as the jury’s and so her
testimony would not “fit” the case.25 What the expert can describe
is either the likelihood ratio associated with a match or its effect on
24

This assumes that the test was error free.
See, e.g., State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (rejecting
an expert’s posterior probability testimony based on the expert’s assumed 50%
prior probability).
25
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the posterior odds. The description of the likelihood ratio would be
as follows: The probability of seeing a match is 950 times greater
if bullets came from the same melt than if they came from different
melts. Alternatively, the expert may describe the effect on the
posterior odds by stating: The odds that two bullets came from the
same melt are increased 950 times when a match is identified.
Notice that in both formulations, the witness does not give the
absolute level of probabilities or odds, for example, that the bullets
probably came from the same melt, but only the change in
probabilities or odds attendant on finding a match.
In light of the potentially misleading nature of bullet lead
evidence, the Committee recommended that FBI experts limit their
testimony to a description of the likelihood ratio associated with a
given match, as described above. In fact, the Committee went
further and recommended that, in view of the uncertainties in the
estimates of the error rates, FBI experts should not quantify the
likelihood ratio, but should only say that bullets from the same
melt are more likely to be analytically indistinguishable than
bullets from different melts, or that the fact that bullets are
analytically indistinguishable makes it more likely that they came
from the same melt.26 The testimonial limitations suggested in the
Committee’s recommendation obviously would apply not only to
bullet lead, but to all kinds of expert identification testimony. If
generally adopted, they would change the way opinions in expert
testimony are expressed in our courts.

26

Report, supra note 2, at 107.

FINKELSTEIN MACROED FINAL 2-17-05.DOC

130

3/8/2005 12:33 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

B. Defendant as the Source
When confronted with FBI testimony that bullets match,
defense counsel commonly and correctly point out that many
bullets are made from a single melt. The number ranges from
thousands to millions, and there is usually no way of knowing how
large the melt was for the bullets involved in a case. Moreover,
geographical distribution of bullets from a melt may affect the
probability of finding matching bullets. For example, if bullets
made from a single melt are sent to a distributor in a small town or
to a vendor in a city neighborhood, every gun owner in the area
may have them. But distribution patterns, as the Committee’s
report makes clear, are not available to the public and were not
made available by manufacturers to the Committee.27
These gaps in our knowledge do not affect the likelihood ratio
associated with bullet lead matching or the validity of test.
Whether there are many or few bullets made from a melt, or how
they are distributed, does not affect the probability that the bullets
would match if they came from the same melt or the probability
that they would match if they came from different melts. What
these factors do affect is the second inference, that is, the
probability that the crime-scene bullet came from the defendant if
the bullets came from the same melt. While it is reasonable to
conclude that it is more likely that the crime-scene bullet came
from the defendant if it matches the defendant’s other bullets than
if it did not, no FBI bullet-lead witness has the expertise to attach a
probability to that inference. Thus, the report ruled out any
testimony as to that probability as a matter of expertise,
recognizing that jurors would have to take that step, if at all, on
their own.28
The difficulty is that jurors have no common experience by
which to judge the strength of the connection between a bullet’s
coming from the same melt and from the same person. Bullet-lead
matching has been described as circumstantial evidence akin to
testimony that the suspect wore a red ski parka coupled with an
27
28

Id. at 102.
Id.
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investigator’s finding a red ski parka in the suspect’s closet. But in
that case, jurors may have some feeling (possibly quite wrong) for
the frequency of red parkas and their distribution, while in bullet
lead matching they have no experience with either subject. The
absence of expert testimony on the subject of frequency and
distribution significantly weakens the value of this evidence.
The effect of the size of the melt and the distribution of bullets
made from it can be formalized by considering the likelihood ratio
(LR) for a match, given that the crime-scene bullet came from the
defendant or from someone else. As previously noted, given that
the bullets came from the same melt or from different melts, the
conditional probabilities of a match do not depend on whether or
not the defendant is the source of the bullet. It follows that the LR
can be expressed as:
LR =

P[ M | G ] P[ M | S ] ⋅ P[ S | G ] + P[ M | S ] ⋅ P[ S | G ]
=
,
P[ M | G ] P[ M | S ] ⋅ P[ S | G ] + P[ M | S ] ⋅ P[ S | G ]

where M is the event that the bullets match; S is that they come
from the same melt; S is that they come from different melts; G is
that the crime-scene bullet came from the defendant; and G is that
it came from someone else. Assuming that false positives are rare,
P[ M | S ] will be quite small and the second term of the numerator
and denominator may be disregarded. Moreover, because the FBI
will test all of the defendant’s bullets, it is very likely that if the
defendant is the source of the crime-scene bullet, the Bureau will
find at least one of defendant’s bullets from the same melt; thus
P[ S | G ] will be close to 1. With these reductions, LR will be
approximately equal to 1 P[ S | G ] , the reciprocal of the probability
that an innocent person would have a bullet from the same melt as
the crime-scene bullet. This probability depends on the size of the
melt and distribution practices, as previously noted.
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IV. THE ISSUE OF SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT
A. Homogeneity of Melts
The validity of even properly circumscribed testimony depends
on scientific support for the likelihood ratio associated with the
test. Assumed values for both the numerator and denominator of
the ratio have been subjected to criticism. The numerator is the
probability that the FBI would declare a match if the two bullets
came from the same melt. As noted, this turns on the homogeneity
of melts and, to a lesser extent, on measurement error. If melts are
inhomogeneous, then the probability of finding a match will be
reduced for bullets from the same melt.
The Committee spent considerable time examining the
evidence bearing on homogeneity. Experts agreed that there was
some inhomogeneity in a melt, but disagreed on its extent and
significance.29 The melting process causes convective stirring of
the molten lead in the kettle, so that all of the bullets made from
the same melt would tend to have the same elemental composition.
However, some smelters add lead to replenish the pot during a
pour and this can change the composition of billets created during
an extended pour. Inhomogeneity may also arise because solutes
tend to migrate to the center of the billet during solidification. On
the other hand, the extrusion process is thought to reduce
inhomogeneity caused by segregation because the flow of the solid
is turbulent as the billet is squeezed through the mouth of the die.30
After considering conflicting reports on homogeneity, the
Committee concluded that it was “unclear whether macro- and
microscale inhomogeneities are present at some or all of the stages

29

Compare Robert D. Koons & Diana M. Grant, Compositional Variation
in Bullet Lead Manufacture, 47 J. FOREN. SCI. 950 (2002) (finding no significant
inhomogeneity), with Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the
Interpretation of Bullet Lead Compositional Analysis, 127 FOREN. SCI. INT’L.
174 (2000) (finding significant inhomogeneity).
30
Report, supra note 2, at 82-84.
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of lead and bullet production and if such inhomogeneities would
affect [compositional analysis of bullet lead or] CABL.”31
Arguably, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue of homogeneity
to make use of CABL. In its report, the Committee dealt with the
problem by making the reasonable assumption that at least some
part of a melt had to be homogeneous within measurement error
(otherwise there would be no matches) and by treating that part, in
effect, as a smaller melt. The Committee called this a
“compositionally indistinguishable volume of lead” or “CIVL.”32
The CIVL might be as large as a vat of molten lead, the
composition of which was not altered during the pouring of bullets,
or a series of billets that were poured before the composition of the
vat was altered by the addition of more lead to replenish the vat.
The report observed that the probative force of a match would be
increased if only a part of a melt were homogeneous because fewer
matching bullets would be made from a smaller volume of lead.33
B. Measurement Error
In appraising the number of bullets produced by the CIVL,
however, the report recognized that it would have to be assumed,
conservatively, that the entire melt was involved because the size
of the CIVL could not be known.34 With this assumption, the
numerator of the likelihood ratio would be one, except for
measurement error. Measurement error could potentially affect the
test by causing it to declare that bullets do not match when, in fact,
the bullets came from the same melt. This type of error makes the
numerator of the likelihood ratio less than one and reduces the
probative force of the test, other things being equal. However, as
noted above, the effect would be small. Moreover, by declaring a
non-match when bullets in fact come from the same melt, the

31
32
33
34

Id. at 82.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.

FINKELSTEIN MACROED FINAL 2-17-05.DOC

134

3/8/2005 12:33 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

effect of this error will generally be exonerating, which makes it of
lesser concern than a false positive.35
More significantly, the allowance for measurement error
creates the match window that leads an FBI expert to conclude that
two bullets that have different measurements, but are within the
window, are “analytically indistinguishable.” The size of the
window affects the denominator of the likelihood ratio, and it is the
denominator that is of greater concern because it measures the rate
of falsely incriminating evidence. The value of the denominator,
assumed to be very small, is what makes the likelihood ratio so
large.
C. The Problem of False Positives
Scientific support for the assumed low rate of false positives
raises a controversial issue.36 The risk of coincidental matches is
the point of focus for critics of the FBI, who argue that the risk of
false positives is much higher than FBI witnesses admit.37 On the
stand, FBI experts have gone so far as to describe the rate of false
positives as zero.38 In response to claims that the false positive rate
was high, the FBI made a study of the matter and the question now
is whether that study justifies the conclusion that the FBI would
draw from it.39
35

But not always. For example, if one of two suspects did a shooting,
finding that the bullets did not match those in the house of one suspect would be
some evidence, perhaps not very strong, pointing to the other.
36
It might be thought that if the FBI testifies only that the bullets are
analytically indistinguishable that there is no false positive because the
statement is true when there is a coincidental match. However, what follows
from that conclusion, stated or unstated, is that the bullets come from the same
melt, and that is false.
37
Randich et al., supra note 29.
38
See, e.g., Trial Transcript of Testimony of Charles Peters at 9, 21-22,
State v. Washington, No. 96-GS-40-10316 (S.C. Ct. 1998).
39
A weakness of the study is that it has not been published. Robert Koons,
the principal FBI architect of the study, is in the course of preparing it for
publication. The description of the study, which follows, is based on
presentations made by Mr. Koons to the commission. See Report, supra note 2,
at 28-35, 54-60.
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In conducting the study, the FBI used its archive data on
approximately 23,000 bullets that were collected over fourteen
years in about 1,000 cases. From this inventory, the Bureau
collected data for as many bullets as it could reasonably be sure
came from different melts. To arrive at this sample, the Bureau
took each case in its inventory and selected from it data for one
bullet of each type (principally caliber), of each alloy class
(defined by the amount of antimony in the lead), and from each
manufacturer (when this was known). If there were multiple bullets
in the same cluster, the Bureau picked one at random. The Bureau
also included data for some bullets that were not connected with
any case. However, it did not make cross–case comparisons, that
is, it did not rule out multiple bullets from the same alloy class of
the same manufacturer across cases. Thus, some bullets included in
the sample might have come from the same melt.
The Bureau collected data from 1,837 bullets as a result of this
winnowing process.40 It then looked at every possible pair of
bullets and counted the number of matches by its two-standarddeviation criterion. There were 1,686,366 pairs, of which 693
matched, or about 1 in 2,433. Because the bullets in the selected
sample came primarily (if not exclusively) from different melts,
the results of the study indicate that the probability of a false
positive would be less than 1 in 2,433. Although current practice is
to measure concentrations of seven elements, not all bullets in the
selected sample had all seven elements measured. The rate of false
positives is even lower if attention is confined to those bullets in
the selected sample for which all seven elements were measured.
There were 854 such bullets and 47 pairs matched by the twostandard-deviation criterion.41 With 364,231 possible pairs and 47
matches, the rate of false matching is less than 1 in 7,750. These
results strongly support the FBI’s opinion that a positive test is
highly probative evidence that matching bullets came from the
same melt.42
40

We refer to this process and the collection of bullets as the “selected
sample.”
41
Report, supra note 2, at 190, Table K.8.
42
The FBI frequently compares one or more crime-scene bullets against
multiple bullets found in the possession of the suspect. In such cases involving
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The Committee’s report faced two ways on the rate of false
positives. On one hand, the report determined that “CABL is
sufficiently reliable to support testimony that bullets from the same
compositionally indistinguishable volume of lead (CIVL) are more
likely to be analytically indistinguishable than bullets from
different CIVLs.”43 Although this testimony could be given even
with a high rate of false positives,44 the concept of reliable
scientific evidence surely implies that the procedure’s rate of false
positives will be low. This assumption is made explicit in other
places in the report. For example, the report sets out a proposed
“boiler plate” informational sheet to be distributed to lawyers and
judges with the FBI’s laboratory report. The Committee suggests
that the sheet include the following: “Considering the thousands of
‘batches’ of lead produced over a number of years, there is a
reasonably high probability that some will repeat. However, the
probability that any given composition would repeat within the
next several years could be expected to be quite low.”45 This
sounds reasonable, but neither the report nor the sheet supports
either statement, nor defines the phrase “quite low.”
One might think that these findings were based on the FBI
study, even though it is not cited in support of them. However,
although the report confirms the FBI’s result, it puts the study to
one side on the ground that the sample collected by the FBI was
not a random sample and could have been biased.46 The possibility
of bias is based on the fact that the winnowing process could have
made the bullets in the selected sample further apart in elemental
multiple comparisons, the usual statistical practice is to multiply the probability
of a false positive in a single comparison by the number of comparisons to
obtain an upper bound for the probability of one or more false positives among
the multiple comparisons. Thus, if many comparisons are made, the risk of a
false positive can become much larger than when a single comparison is made.
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 59-60.
43
Report, supra note 2, at 107. This finding is repeated in Chapter 5, Major
Findings and Recommendations. Id. at 112.
44
For example, if the numerator of the likelihood ratio were 1, the
described testimony would be literally true if the rate of false positives were any
number less than 100%.
45
Id. at 168.
46
Id. at 40, 49, 55.
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composition than bullets in some relevant population, producing a
lower rate of false matches in the sample than in the population.47
Instead of the low rates of false positives generated in the
FBI’s study, the authors of Chapter 3 of the Committee’s report
estimated remarkably higher rates of false positives using
computer simulations.48 However, these simulated rates are
unlikely to be good estimates of the actual rates of false positives.
The simulations were of probabilities conditional on various
assumed differences in elemental concentrations between the crime
scene bullets and the suspect’s bullets; there was no attempt to
calculate an unconditional probability that would incorporate the
likelihood that differences as small as those assumed would in fact
be encountered in bullets from different melts. Taking those
likelihoods into account would probably decrease the simulated
rates.49 This is a striking omission given that the risk of false
positives is the principal point of attack by critics of the FBI.
D. Testimony of Bullet Lead Analysis and Daubert
Thus, the FBI study is the only current basis for estimating the
unconditional rate of false positives. But since that study was
rejected for possible bias, the Committee’s conclusion that the
evidence was reliable, while not unreasonable, would seem to lack
47

Id. The committee did not specify a relevant population and referred to it
somewhat inconsistently. Compare id. at 56 (“all bullets collected by the FBI in
criminal investigations”), with id. at 49 (“a full subset of bullets drawn from
different melts”). We suggest that a useful population would be all bullets sent
to the FBI that came from different melts.
48
See id. at 59, Table 3.10 (false positive rates between 12.7% and 40.4%).
49
In the simulations, the assumed differences between bullets would appear
to be smaller than the average actual differences between bullets from different
melts, which increases the simulated rate of false positives. Table 3.10 reports,
in columns, simulated false positive rates for differences in elemental
composition between bullets assuming a range of 3% to 10%, whereas the actual
differences for five of the elements in the selected sample range between 20%
and 52%. The footnote to the table acknowledges that “the columns represent
differences in bullets that are relatively small given the distribution of betweenbullet differences from the 1,837 bullet set. One would expect the false match
probability to be smaller for larger differences between bullets.” Id. at 59.
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scientific support (at least none is cited within the report). The
existence of such support is required for admissibility of expert
scientific testimony under Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals.50
The FBI has argued that its extensive experience is a
reasonable substitute for a quantitative study and in some courts it
may be seen as such. In fact, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has
long affirmed that an expert may be qualified on the basis of
“experience” to testify to “technical or other specialized
knowledge.”51
The rationale for Daubert’s strict standards suggests, however,
that bullet lead analysis is not a field in which one may rely on
experience in the absence of a rigorous study. One of the factors
listed by the court in Daubert as the test of scientific knowledge is
the known or potential error rate.52 The FBI’s extensive experience
does not give it a solid basis for determining the rate of false
positives because the examiners have no way of knowing whether
the bullets they matched in fact came from the same melt. As a
result, the FBI’s testimony is delivered with the impressive
credentials of hard science, but the core of the matter is a distinctly
unscientific leap of faith. Jurors (and some judges) are apt to
ascribe at least some of the authority of the scientific part of the
enterprise to the expert’s unsupported belief—delivered with equal
conviction—that the technique she uses has a low error rate.
Of course, the belief of the expert witness is unsupported only
if one does not credit the FBI’s study. In United States v. Mikos,53
the only opinion that directly addresses the validity of the study
under Daubert, District Judge Guzman rejected the study and
excluded the expert’s proffered opinion that the bullets probably
came from the same melt.54 Judge Guzman based his ruling on the
50

509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the general acceptance of a scientific
technique is not a precondition for admission of expert testimony based upon
that technique so long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the
Federal Rules of Evidence are met).
51
FED. R. EVID. 702.
52
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
53
2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
54
Id. at *6.
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conclusion that the FBI’s sample was not randomly selected. The
court wrote that it agreed with the defense’s argument that the
FBI’s collection methods lacked “any scientifically accepted
sampling procedure,” and concluded that because “the FBI’s
historical database fails to satisfy accepted scientific methodology
. . . [it] cannot form the basis for expert opinion testimony under
Daubert.”55
V. A NEW APPROACH FOR THE FBI
The FBI is presently considering how to respond to the Mikos
case. The court in Mikos may have been too quick in rejecting the
Bureau’s selected sample study as unscientific. Because most of the
cases in the FBI’s inventory were included, the FBI’s study did not
involve a sample of cases, but rather a sampling of bullets from
clusters. Multi-level sampling, including cluster sampling, is a wellaccepted statistical technique.56 Nevertheless, the reaction of the
55

Id. at *5. The court also commented that the FBI’s sample of 1,837
bullets was too small to be reliable to extrapolate to 150 billion bullets made in
the United States during the past thirty years and that there was no precise and
generally accepted definition of a “source” or “batch.” Id.
These objections do not seem to be valid. The fact that sources may come in
different sizes and may be inhomogeneous does not, for the reasons already
given, detract from the evidence and may in fact add to it when a match is
found. The fact that the FBI inventory is small relative to the universe of bullets
is not of concern for three reasons: (1) the population to be represented arguably
is the population of bullets sent to the FBI that are from different melts and this
population is not huge relative to the sample; (2) in any event, the size of the
population being represented is irrelevant to the scientific acceptability of the
sample; and (3) if the population were more diverse than the sample, as the court
implies, the study would overstate, not understate, the rate of false positives.
A more telling objection would be that the FBI’s inventory includes bullets
analyzed over the past 14 years. In that time elemental composition may have
changed, creating larger differences between bullets made over time than across
those made currently. For example, the Bureau has noted a decline in silver
during this period. The influence of this factor has yet to be studied. The Bureau
acknowledges this point, but replies that sometimes old bullets are found in
current cases, so one cannot assume that all comparisons will be made between
currently made bullets.
56
See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 257-60.
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Mikos court suggests that it will be very difficult, if not impossible,
for the Bureau to winnow out bullets from its inventory to ensure
that they come from different melts without incurring the risk that
the sample so selected will be rejected as possibly biased. We
therefore suggest that the Bureau take a different tack and select a
random sample of bullets without eliminations for same-melt status
and compute the rate of positives, both true and false, as an upper
bound for the rate of false positives. Our preliminary analysis
indicates that such positives would be quite rare—less than one in a
thousand—which would seem to provide ample support for the
reliability of CABL and justify the Committee’s conclusion in that
regard.
In our analysis, a cluster of bullets is a group of bullets of the
same characteristics (for example, alloy class, style, etc.) organized
such that only one of them would be picked under the FBI’s
selected sample procedure. We make the “worst case” assumption
that the clusters are perfectly homogeneous, that is, that all the
bullets in a cluster would match each other. It follows that when
two bullets from two different clusters match, all the bullets in the
two clusters would match each other and when two bullets from
different clusters do not match, then none of the bullets in the two
clusters would match across the clusters.57
Let there be n cases in the FBI’s selected sample and assume
that there are two clusters of bullets in each case; thus there are 2n
clusters. Assume further that there are m matching pairs. Under the
FBI’s method of taking one bullet from each cluster, the rate of
false matches would be

R=

m 58
.
 2n 
 
2

57

This applies only across clusters; they would still match within the
clusters.
58

 2n 

The expression   should be read as “2n choose 2,” the number of
2
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Now assume that each cluster is of size c and that all bullets are
included in the study, not merely one from each cluster. What is
the rate of matches (say, R’), both true and false? On the “worst
case” assumption previously described, the number of matches
from the m matching pairs of clusters is
 2c 
m  and the number of matches from the 2n-2m non-matching
2
c
clusters is 2(n − m)  . Because the total number of pairs of
 2
 2c 
c
m  + 2(n − m) 
2
 2cn 
 2 .
 , the rate of matching is R' =  
bullets is 
 2cn 
 2 


 2 
Using

the

simplifications

 2n  2n(2n − 1)
  =
≈ 2n 2
2
2

and

 2cn  (2cn)(2cn − 1)

 =
≈ 2n 2c 2 , the above expressions for R and
2
 2 
m + n(1 − 1c )
m
R’ become R ≈ 2 and R' ≈
. Thus, going from R to
2n
2n 2
n(1 − 1c ) c − 1
R’ adds only about
=
to the rate of matching. When
2n 2
2nc
n is large, this is not a large addition and it leaves the rate of
matching quite low.
For example, suppose that there are n = 1,000 cases (as the FBI
has in its inventory), each with two clusters (about the average
number per case in the FBI selected sample study) and that each
cluster has c = 10 bullets (the average size for the FBI clusters in
its study). Suppose further that the rate of matching in the selected
pairs that can be chosen from 2n bullets.
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sample study is R=1/2400, as the FBI found. Consequently,

R' ≈ R +

9
= 1 .
20,000 1,154

This last result is an upper bound for the rate of matches, both
true and false, and is thus a kind of upper-upper bound for the rate
of false matches.59 Of course, this is only an estimate using our
worst case assumption and an average size for clusters; the FBI
would have to draw a random sample and apply its criteria to
demonstrate convincingly that the rate of matching is low. To add
credibility, any new study should be designed, or at least approved,
by outside experts, and the results should be published in a peerreviewed journal.

59

The rate would be even lower if attention is confined to bullets for which
all seven elements have been measured. See supra text accompanying note 41.

